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THE SPIRIT OF 1968:
TOWARD ABOLISHING TERRY DOCTRINE
FRANK RUDY COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
As I understand it, the mission of the Teaching From the Left conference is
to "think outside the box." The box here is the common sense of an increasingly
reactionary jurisprudential mainstream. To get out of that box, we need to move
beyond liberal scholarship.
Change is necessary because liberal scholars have been tethered to what is
when imagining what could be.1 For instance, the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
2
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Even liberal scholars have assumed that the U.S. Supreme Court's current
interpretation of that language-that it only requires reasonable police action and
that probable cause is merely one way of clearly passing that threshold-will
remain the rule. Conceding that point forecloses the possibility of a truly "Left"
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
If this conference is not merely about tinkering with what is, it is also about
imagining a whole different world. There is indeed a better world that might
have been: the world of early 1968. That year began with the voices of Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy calling for radical, concrete change. In so

* © 2007. Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. J.D., Duke University; B.A.,
Amherst College. I dedicate this essay to my son, Thelonious Abraham Cooper. May he live in
1968. I thank my research assistant, Audra Medeiros, and legal assistant, Tina Lewis. I also thank
Anthony Farley and Maria Grahn-Farley for encouraging me to continue thinking Left. Special
thanks to Marcia M. Henry and the staff of the New York University Review of Law & Social
Change for editorial excellence. I welcome comments at fcooper@suffolk.edu.
1. Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner describe culture as the dialectic between what is
and what might be. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 219 (2000).
See also id. at 228 (identifying racial dialectic of American culture); id. at 230 (noting due process
dialectic of criminal procedure law). Elsewhere, I describe my general conception of the
relationship between law and culture. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect" From Racial

Profilingto Depolicing: Toward a Critical CulturalTheory, in THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH:

A CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH 139, 150-51 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds.,
2006) (reviewing. Law & Cultural Studies scholarship).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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many ways, however, 1968 is the year that revolutionary thought was killed off.
The FBI assassinated King for linking black civil rights with peace and
economic justice. 3 Perhaps more importantly, the FBI killed Kennedy for4
raising the prospect that a more-than-liberal politician would control the state.
Most important of all, and surprisingly rarely mentioned here in the United
States, the French government squelched a true revolution that had linked
5
unions, peace activists, and other Leftists.
While 1968 was the death of the Left, it also created ashes from which a
new revolution in thought might emerge. For example, we are all steeped in the
post-structuralist ideas of Althusser,6 Foucault, and Derrida, 8 each of whom
emerges from the post-1968 French intelligentsia. More mundanely, in its 1968
Terry v. Ohio opinion 9 , the U.S. Supreme Court almost made probable cause the
sine qua non of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, in early 1968, the Terry
'l l
10
Court seriously contemplated a requirement that police "stops" and "frisks"
of citizens be based upon a showing of probable cause that the suspect had
committed a crime.1 2 By mid-1968, however, the final Terry decision allowed
stops and frisks upon a showing of mere reasonable suspicion that a crime was
afoot. If we could return to the spirit of early 1968, we could regenerate a Left
Fourth Amendment from the ground the Court has allowed to lie fallow.
3. This is my opinion. See generally MARK LANE & DICK GREGORY, MURDER IN MEMPHIS:
THE FBI AND THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (Thunder's Mouth Press 1993) (1977)
(reviewing the circumstances of King's assassination); WILLIAM F. PEPPER, ORDERS TO KILL: THE
TRUTH BEHIND THE MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (Warner Books 1998) (1995) (same).

4. This is my opinion. See generally Lisa Pease, The RFK Plot Part I: The Grand Illusion,
reprinted in JOE BROWN & ZACHARY SKLAR, THE ASSASSINATIONS: PROBE MAGAZINE ON JFK,
MLK, RFK, AND MALCOLM X 536, 536-70 (James DiEugenio & Lisa Pease eds., Feral House
2003) (1998) (describing elements of the Robert Kennedy assassination indicating a conspiracy);

Lisa Pease, The RFK Plot PartII: Rubik's Cube, reprinted in BROWN & SKLAR, supra, at 571, 571610 (1998) (analyzing possible participants in the assassination plot).
5. See generally ANDREW FEENBERG & JIM FREEDMAN, WHEN POETRY RULED THE STREETS:
THE FRENCH MAY EVENTS OF 1968 (2001) (describing student and worker protests in France).
6. See generally Louis ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes
Towards an Investigation), in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 170-86 (Ben

Brewster trans., 1971) (defining interpellation).
7. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975) (describing contemporary forms of power).
8. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans.,
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1998) (1976) (considering and expanding upon post-structuralist
linguistic theory).

9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. A "stop" occurs when an officer halts someone for purposes of questioning and the
encounter falls between a mere consensual encounter and an arrest. See Cooper, supra note 1, at
141 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).

11. A "frisk" occurs when an officer's patting down of the outer surface of a suspect's
clothing in search of weapons falls between a mere consensual encounter and a "full blown"
search. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 141-42 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25)).

12. See John Q. Barrett, Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of Police
Stops and Frisks Based on Less Than ProbableCause, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 295, 304
(Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (describing opinion's drafting).
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In this essay, I summarize how the Terry opinion's refusal to apply the
probable cause standard made Fourth Amendment doctrine more conservative. I
then suggest that the result has gone largely unchallenged because whites have
been willing to trade decreases in the civil liberties of blacks for perceived
increases in crime control. I conclude by calling on us to consider returning to
the spirit of the beginning of 1968 by abolishing Terry doctrine.
I.
THE ASSASSINATION OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD

When I say that 1968 almost saw the Supreme Court make probable cause
the sine qua non of the Fourth Amendment, I refer to the Terry v. Ohio
decision. 13 Therein, the Court considers a case where a white police officer
observed two black men take turns peering into a store window, consult with a
white man, and then peer into the store window again. 14 The officer grabbed the
men and patted down the outsides of their clothing to determine whether they
had weapons.1 5 The issue was whether a weapons charge should be dismissed
on grounds that the stops and frisks of the suspects violated the Fourth
Amendment. 16 The Terry Court held that the police may stop and frisk people
upon reasonablesuspicion that a crime is afoot rather than probablecause that a
crime is afoot. 17 Prior to the Terry decision, probable cause-a greater quantum
of evidence than reasonable suspicion 18-was the more traditional standard
for
19
establishing the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of police actions.
The Terry Court borrowed the reasonable suspicion standard from Camara
v. Municipal Court,20 a case decided one year earlier. That decision determined
whether a municipal inspector may search an apartment for municipal code
violations without first procuring a warrant based upon probable cause. 2 1 The
traditional probable cause test would have required the inspector to establish
13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
14. Id. at 6. Anthony Thompson discusses the way the Terry Court hid the fact that the races
of the parties affected the officer's suspiciousness. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 964-68 (1999) (critiquing
Court's refusal to mention parties' races). David Sklansky links the Court's refusal to explicitly
acknowledge the effect of race while implicitly remedying racial discrimination in its criminal
procedure jurisprudence to the predominance of pluralist political theory. See David Alan
Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1754 (2005) ("Pluralism may well

have played a role, though, in keeping [racial equality] 'domesticated' and almost entirely
subtextual.").
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
16. Id. at 9 (noting the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness).
17. Id. at 21-22.

18. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (declaring that reasonable suspicion
requires less and less-reliable evidence).
19. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 11 (referring to Petitioner's argument that "the traditional
jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment" requires probable cause).
20. 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (articulating the Camara standard).
21. See Camara,387 U.S. at 526-27.
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suspicion as to the particular dwelling being searched. The Camara Court
decided municipal inspections are a special case requiring "balancing" the
government's general interest in inspecting the houses in an area against the
individual's private interest in her particular building. 22 Accordingly, it held that
such inspections are constitutionally reasonable whenever the balancing test
weighs in the government's favor. 2 3 But the Camara decision explicitly states
24
that the probable cause test is the standard for criminal investigations.
The February 1968 first draft of the Terry opinion followed the Camara
decision's interpretation of probable cause. Chief Justice Warren originally
intended to write lengthy Miranda-type2 5 instructions for police officers wishing
to conduct stops and frisks. 26 Perhaps because of widespread popular criticism
of the Warren Court in general and the Miranda opinion in particular, 27 the other
Justices had no stomach for such an approach.2 8 Warren's first draft of the Terry
opinion thus straightforwardly holds that probable cause is the standard for both
stops and frisks. 29 The first draft concludes that the Terry facts meet that
30
standard.
When Justice Brennan got his hands on the opinion, the holding shifted
dramatically. 3 1 Brennan's redraft of the Terry opinion, which is essentially the
final version, implicitly rejects the Camara Court's bar against applying the
balancing test to criminal investigations. Instead, the final version of the Terry
opinion holds that probable cause is actually irrelevant to activity governed only
by the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause. 3 2 Without mentioning the
prior stricture against applying the balancing test to criminal investigations, the
final Terry opinion cites the Camara decision when describing the test for stops
and frisks of suspects. 3 3 Stops and frisks need only be based on reasonable
34
suspicion, not probable cause.
22. Id. at 536-37.
23. See id. at 535.
24. Id. ("For example, in a criminal investigation... a search for [stolen] goods, even with a
warrant, is 'reasonable' only when there is 'probable cause' to believe that they will be uncovered
in a particular dwelling"); id. at 538 (rejecting argument that "vary[ing] the probable cause test
from the standard applied in criminal cases would.. . lessen the overall protections of the Fourth
Amendment").
25. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (invalidating confession evidence
that did not protect Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to the degree of specified warnings).
26. See Barrett, supra note 12, at 304 (describing opinion's drafting).
27. See MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS

OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960s 3 (2005) (describing conservatives' extreme dislike for the Warren

Court).
28. Barrett, supra note 12, at 304.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 305.
31. See id. (describing Brennan's change of heart about probable cause).
32. See id. (summarizing Brennan's rewrite).
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).

34. See id. at 20 (distinguishing Fourth Amendment clauses governing different types of
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Reconsider the text of the Fourth Amendment in light of the Terry opinion's
evisceration of the probable cause standard. One might easily think, as Tracey
Maclin does, that the clause containing the probable cause standard explains the
clause requiring reasonableness. 3 5 Until the Camara decision, the Court
generally interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring probable cause. 3 6 So
why did the Terry Court abandon probable cause? Some, such as Akhil Reed
Amar, argue that the logic of the Fourth Amendment required the determination
that probable cause is not required. 37 Looking with a more jaundiced eye-one
made that way by our nation's history of unconstitutionally searching and
seizing Leftists and racial minorities38-- suspect the Terry decision expresses a
prioritization of "law and order" over civil liberties, particularly the civil liberties
of racial minorities. 3 9 Chief Justice Warren circulated the final Terry draft
opinion for approval of the other Justices in May 1968, just after the country had
been engulfed in extensive urban riots responding to the assassination of Martin
Luther King, Jr. 40 Justice Douglas's dissent suggests that concern about such
"modern forms of lawlessness" 4 1 may have led the Court to abandon its prior
interpretation of what the Fourth Amendment requires of criminal investigations.
II.
THE CONTRACT AGAINST BLACK CIVIL LIBERTIES

Why has the assassination of the probable cause standard gone largely
unchallenged? One reason is the common assertion that conditions must be
"right" before we try to combat the erosion of civil liberties. The problem is that
there will never be a "good time" for the expansion of Fourth Amendment rights.
Yale Kamisar identifies the problem:
police conduct).
35. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1994) (declaring that "the Warrant Clause defines and interprets
the Reasonableness Clause").
36. Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (citing no precedent for the
proposition that "reasonableness.is still the ultimate standard").
37. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 774
(1994) (contending "[t]he Warrant Clause says only when warrants may not issue, not when they

may, or must").
38. See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who is an "American" and What
is Protectedby EnhancedLaw Enforcement and Intelligence Powers?, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 23,
31-40 (2003) (detailing CIA and FBI abuses of authority against Leftist and racial minority
groups).
39. See FLAMM, supra note 27, at 7 (arguing that economic stagnation made working-class
whites "more receptive to messages that blamed others-especially minorities..."). Another way
of thinking about the Terry opinion is that it responds to a "masculinity crisis." See Frank Rudy
Cooper, Policing Masculinities (Mar. 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 n.l 1 (1968)) (theorizing that the Terry Court refused to

deter officers from using stops and frisks "to maintain the power image of the beat officer" because
it wanted to allow officers to be manly in interactions with citizens).
40. See Barrett, supra note 12, at 306 (describing timing of circulation).
41. Terry, 392 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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According to the media, the claims of law enforcement officials and the
statements of politicians, we have always been experiencing a "crime
crisis" -at no time in our recent, or not-so-recent past, has there been a
time when "society" could afford a strengthening or expansion of the
rights of the accused. 42
If we wait for a time when the mainstream is ready to prioritize rights, the spirit
of 1968 will never return. An obvious example of this delay is the current
argument that civil liberties are inappropriate in a "post-9/1 1 world., 43 As
Green Day sings, "Wake me up when September ends." 4 4 Our role as Left
theorists is to declare an end to the latest "crisis" and demand an expansion of
rights rather than a mere return to the already truncated rights that existed on
September 10, 2001.
A second reason that politically conservative Terry doctrine has gone
largely unchallenged is that the mainstream of the public has made an implicit
contract with those seeking law and order: the police are granted nearly
unfettered discretion so long as they do not use those powers on "good" citizens.
Donald Dripps reveals why this contract is formed: "Almost everyone has an
interest in controlling crime. Only young men, disproportionately black, are at a
significant risk of erroneous prosecution for garden-variety felonies." 45 We
must recognize that this is the linchpin of the denial of rights. People are willing
to trade rights for law enforcement protection based on the implicit bargain that
excessive law enforcement power will be utilized primarily against the
marginalized. As Natsu Taylor Saito argues, measures designed for "our"
security have never considered Leftists or racial minorities to be part of the
"us." 4 6 Likewise, Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner point out that the
way that the U.S. has resolved the conflict between its espousal of egalitarian
values and its encouragement of the pursuit of self-interest is by presuming that
47
some people are not part of the "us."
The resolution of the egalitarianism versus self-interest conflict is played out

42. Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 46 (1995).

Quarter-Century

43. This argument has roots in the 1960s. See FLAMM, supra note 27, at 3 (describing
conservative argument that "the community's right to order-to public safety as they saw it-took
precedence over the individual's right to freedom").
44. GREEN DAY, Wake Me Up When September Ends, on BULLET IN A BIBLE (Reprise
Records 2005) (lampooning post-9/1 1 militarism).

45. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for CriminalProcedure: Dickerson, Miranda,
and the Continuing Questfor Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 46 (2001).
46. See generally Saito, supra note 38, at 23-24 (connecting current push for PATRIOT Act
to past counter-intelligence against Leftists and racial minorities).
47. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 1, at 262 ("By dividing humanity into 'Us' and
'Others'-the naturally entitled and the naturally unentitled-racism permits Us to believe that We
have limitless opportunities and are right to enjoy them without concern that any scarcity of
opportunities for Them will encumber Our future ....
");see also id. at 262-63 (discussing the
effects of the "Us" and "Them" divide).
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on the backs of blacks, especially by means of law enforcement. There was a
virtually uninterrupted tradition of excluding blacks from taking a piece of the
pie from 1619 to 1964.48 By 1980, the majority of whites had come to resent
having to share the pie with blacks, as reflected in Ronald Reagan's capture of
the "white ethnic" vote. 49 Increasingly, the white mainstream has engaged in the
psychological process of "splitting": blacks are either fully assimilationist "good
blacks" or "bad blacks." 50 The latter are deemed to be the "dregs" of the black
community and presumed to be dangerous. 5 1 It is the presumption of black
dangerousness that drives a "culture of control" in which surveillance and
preemptive strikes are normalized as methods of dealing with the
marginalized.5 2 This is a culture wherein the present interpretation of the Fourth
53
Amendment trades black civil liberties for a (false) white sense of protection.
A revitalization of the Fourth Amendment will seek to void that bargain.
CONCLUSION

If we are to overcome the barriers to the promotion of civil liberties, we
must return to the spirit of 1968. Everything must go! That includes Terry
doctrine as a whole.
Terry doctrine is not fixable. Its language of "reasonable" suspicion is
inherently ambiguous. 54 It therefore has a tendency to be reduced to its lowest
48. See Loic Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the "Race
Question" in the U.S., 13 NEw LEFT REV. 41, 44 (2002) (identifying continuous U.S. use of
"instruments for the conjoint extraction of labo[r] and social ostracization of' blacks).
49. See id. at 49 ("But while whites begrudgingly accepted 'integration' in principle, in
practice they strove to maintain an unbridgeable social and symbolic gulf .. "); cf DAVID
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 136
(2001) (saying of Reagan anti-crime message, "The public knows, without having to be told, that
these 'superpredators' and high-rate offenders are young minority males .... ").
50. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 874-86, 888-95,
896-903 (2006) (explicating process, motivations, and effects of splitting black men into Bad and
Good groups).
51. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 1, at 277-78.
52. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 49, at 136 (revealing Reagan administration's implicit
argument that "[t]he only practical and rational response to [young minority male superpredators
and high-rate offenders], as soon as they offend if not before, is to have them 'taken out of
circulation' for the protection of the public.").
53. Whites' sense of protection is false in that the contemporary approach to crime seeks only
to reduce the fear of crime, not crime itself. See id. at 122:
When a series of police research studies suggested that some measures might fail to
reduce actual crime rates but nevertheless succeed in reducing the reported levels of
fear and insecurity, the way was opened for a new policy aim. From the 1980s onward,
police departments and government authorities... began to develop mission-statements
and practices that took the reduction of fear as a distinct, self-standing policy goal.
Id. I presume that actually solving street crime would require, inter alia, a massive fiscal and
psychological investment in public schooling that the mainstream is not willing to make.
54. See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the
Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 885 (2002) ("The very terminology
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possible level in order to find a stable standard. Even in its original form, the
Terry opinion contained the seeds of racial profiling because it lowered the
threshold for police interference with citizens and rejected the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People's critique of the reasonable
suspicion doctrine's tendency toward harassment of racial minorities.5 5 Those
seeds have grown into decisions like Whren v. United States.56 There, the
Supreme Court refused to consider racial motivations for an arrest on grounds
that officers with probable cause have already surpassed what the Fourth
57
Amendment minimally requires.
I began this essay by arguing that liberal scholarship has failed us by
accepting the idea that probable cause is merely one way of clearly surpassing
what is usually a reasonableness requirement. What I propose, therefore, is the
abolishment of the right to make Terry stops and frisks based on mere reasonable
suspicion. While we cannot "go home" in the sense of returning to a 1968 that
does not include the contemporary culture of control that I mentioned earlier, we
can return to the probable cause standard. I call for no more, and no less, than a
return to the default position that probable cause is required for all seizures and
searches, including stops and frisks, and that a lesser standard is an exception.
To some, my call for abolishing Terry doctrine as we know it will seem an
unrealistic goal. But is that not what the spirit of 1968 is all about? Yes. 1968
was a time when we dared to dream big. I call on us to dream big again.

of the reasonable suspicion doctrine, therefore, prevents meaningful review of an officer's decision
to stop or frisk a suspect.").
55. See Frank Rudy Cooper, CulturalContext Matters: Terry's "Seesaw Effect ", 56 OKLA. L.
REV. 833, 854-57 (2003) (explaining how the Terry decision's rearticulation of the Fourth
Amendment ignores the risk of racial profiling); Thompson, supra note 14, at 963-78
(demonstrating that the Terry opinion led to approval of racial profiling).
56. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
57. See id. at 811-13 (holding officer's subjective intent generally not considered when she
objectively has probable cause).
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